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1 Introdution
The aim of the following is to examine the epistemi
1
onstraints on self-
updating ognition appliable to both artiial and biologial agents. In par-
tiular, we onsider the problem of how the autonomous updating of an em-
bodied agent's pereptual framework in response to the pereived require-
ments of the environment an our in a logially-onsistent fashion, suh the
ability to validate the agent's representation of the environment is maintained
throughout.
Thus, a ognitive agent employing a representational framework,R, must,
upon examination of a set of observations fog relating to the agent's en-
vironment, be apable of undergoing spontaneous transition to an updated
representational framework R' in whih the environment observations are
transformed into an alternative set of observables fo'g (of possibility diering
ardinality) that are deemed to be more 'representative' of the environment
via some appropriate riterion of representativity. The question then immedi-
ately arises of what form this riterion should take, given that the only aess
that the agent has to the environment in order to determine the representa-
1
ep-i-ste-mi:
1. Of, relating to, or involving knowledge; ognitive.
(The Amerian Heritage

Ditionary of the English Language, 4th Ed. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004).
2. Of, or relating to, epistemology
(WordNet 1.7.1. Prineton University, 2001).
[From the Greek episteme, knowledge℄
e-pis-te-mol-o-gy:
1. The branh of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge,
its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity.
(The Amerian Heritage

Ditionary of the English Language, 4th Ed. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004).
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tivity of representations is via those very same representations. In additional
to this foundational issue, a further diÆulty attahes to the fat that individ-
ual representations of the environment are themselves neessarily onjetural,
suh that even within an appropriate representational framework, R, there
is a question as to whih partiular observation, o, is most appliable to the
urrent situation (i.e. lassial pereptual unertainty).
Systems for ognitive updating hene exhibit the potential for ambiguity
between pereptual representation and pereived objets unless a means an
be found to ensure that the two domains of inferene an be empirially related
while at the same time maintaining their epistemologial distintion. (An au-
tonomous ognitive agent must simultaneously employ some xed pereptual
referene in order to validate environment hypotheses, and a xed environ-
ment representation to validate a partiular pereptual framework). We shall
hene argue that the notion of ognitive updating is ill-founded unless there
exists a framework in whih representational hypotheses an be empirially
falsied via exploratory ativity in the same way as the world representations
desribed in terms of these hypotheses.
By virtue of having adapted to hanging environments, suÆiently-evolved
natural organisms (those that are omplex enough to be onsidered ogni-
tive) have an impliitly updated framework for environmental representation
in whih these diÆulties are overome. In suh organisms, representational
grounding is thus, to a large extent, ensured by natural seletion; representa-
tions that do not meaningfully and eÆiently represent the survival prerog-
atives of the agent in the ontext of its environment inrease the likelihood
of its extintion and geneti removal from the heredity of future generations.
However, in so far as representations are learnable, biologial organisms must
employ an alternative mehanism for ensuring that the way in whih the world
is represented remains onsistent with their survival imperatives. In doing so
they must hene also address the problem of pereptual meaningfulness that
lies at the heart of attempts to reate ognitively autonomous artiial agents.
We term the ativity of mehanisms apable of ahieving this ognitive boot-
strapping. The onept of ognitive bootstrapping is thus analogous to (and
indeed, to the extent that word-onepts are ognitive representations, ex-
emplied by) the pratie of semanti learning that we employ as infants,
in whih we must rst obtain a suÆient (bootstrap) sub-set of words and
word-meanings in order to be able to formulate falsiable questions onern-
ing meaning of new words, and thereby ahieve the ability to expand our
voabulary indenitely.
To this end, we survey a range of artiial ognitive mehanisms that
attempt to address the issue of representational updating, onluding that
only embodied pereption-ation learners apable of hierarhially-abstrating
this relationship in suh a way as to be manipulable in relational/symboli
terms are able to meet the indiated epistemi requirements. (Pereption-
ation learning agents may be haraterized as those for whih 'ation pre-
edes pereption'; that is, agents for whih inferred higher-level perept states
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are onsidered meaningful only insofar as they relate to the agent's ations).
Suh artiial systems limit higher-level symboli learning to that whih is
immediately relevant to the agent, dening the external world in terms of an
inreasingly omplex set of motor apabilities, with the objets of the world
onsequently being represented in terms of their aordanes. Translated into
a multi-agent language-learning ontext, this means that agents engaged in
evolving a olletive ommuniative struture an hene only derive a mean-
ingful syntax in relation to a semantis grounded in their respetive ative
(and olletive interative) apabilities in the environment.
This embodied approah to autonomous ognition thus addresses a number
of diÆulties assoiated with lassial artiial intelligene (in whih intelli-
gene is primarily regarded only in terms of the manipulation of symbols of
xed referential ontent), in partiular those of symbol grounding and logial
framing. Hene, in asserting that autonomous ognition is meaningful only
with regard to embodied agents with limited ation apabilities, the study
of artiial ognitive systems is brought within the domain of evolutionary
systems and adaptive robotis. As suh, we believe these developments are of
onsiderable potential interest to biologial researhers.
The struture of the hapter will therefore be as follows. We ommene, in
setion 2, with a disussion of the epistemologial onstraints on symboli rep-
resentations via an examination of the neessary a priori aspets of ognition
that must be retained throughout any putative updating of the pereptual
framework in order for suh updates to be onsidered empirially meaningful.
We onsider how suh a priori representations arise within naturally evolved
systems. We then, in setion 3, introdue the notion of embodiment within
the ontext of artiial ognitive systems, and indiate, with examples, how
this approah has the potential to address the symbol grounding and framing
problems assoiated with lassial artiial intelligene via notions suh as
aordane. In setion 4, we address the nature of evolving representational
strutures in embodied ommuniative agents. We indiate, in setion 5, how
pereption-ation learning an be employed to hierarhially infer a grounded
symbol set in order to reate fully autonomous artiial ognitive systems a-
pable of dynamially updating their pereptual framework in relation to the
requirements of their pereived environment. We then, in setion 6, disuss
the issues raised in determining the epistemi onstraints on the symboli
abstration of pereption-ation arhitetures appliable to both natural and
artiial agents. We onlude by giving a onise summary of the require-
ments of a ognitive system if it is to be apable of bootstrapping symboli
representations in suh a way as to meet these onstraints.
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2 Open-Ended Symboli Representation: A
Philosophial Perspetive
A Priori Constraints on Cognitive Representation
The argument of the survey revolves around a entral paradox: how an a og-
nitive agent apable of hanging its pereptual framework (that is, its way of
seeing the world) ever validate one partiular set of pereptual representations
over another? The onept of validation would appear (at least in humans)
to depend on the pereption of the inadequay of one pereived entity in rela-
tion to another: however it is not obvious that a pereptual framework ould
ever itself be an objet for pereption. The problem is ertainly not soluble in
terms of either the Cartesian or Classial Empiriist [21℄ shools of philosophy,
sine the rst laims ognitive agents annot absolutely validate the existene
of anything beyond their own pereption (itself built on a framework of pure
reason), and the seond does not reognize the possibility of the pereptual
mediation of the objetive world (objets present themselves as they are 'in
themselves' diretly to ognition).
Kant [22℄, however, provides an alternative oneptual framework, assert-
ing that ognition, as a matter of a priori neessity, refers to entities existing
beyond of an agent's sensory domain. Perepts hene serve to mediate be-
tween agent and objet, being ruial to their distintion as ontologially
separate entities. Objets are thus never pereived by ognitive agents as they
are in themselves (being required to onform to the a priori requirements of
pereption): however, neither are they simply reduible to perepts. Instead,
external objet onepts are aessible to the ognition agent as ordering on-
epts imposed on intuitions (singular, low-level sensory perepts). Objets, as
we understand them, are thus not themselves singular perepts: they are (in
Kant's terminology) syntheti unities.
Thus, despite being neessary a priori, objet onepts are of an inherently
hypothetial nature, existing beyond the immediate ertainty of the sensory
impressions, serving instead as hypothesized linkages between those impres-
sions. Immediate sensory impressions thus refer diretly to the external world
a priori in a way that an not be subjet to empirial testing (being rather
its ondition). The onditions underlying pereption are thus neither logially
true nor false; rather they must simply be assumed to be true in order for
ognition to take plae at all. It is hene this a priori limitation on the pos-
sible updating of ognitive representation that will serve both to sets bounds
upon, as well as to ensure the empirial grounding of, the onept of ognitive
bootstrapping.
Impliit within this understanding of ognition is hene the idea that sen-
sory intuitions an be linked together via ations, ations inherently having
the apability to test objet hypotheses, falsifying those that do not have the
relationship between sensory impressions and ations impliit in the objet
hypothesis. Thus, we might need to walk around an objet in order to es-
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tablish whether the entity progressively revealed to the senses onforms to
our oneption of the objet. Ations thus serve to test the onsisteny of an
observed sequene of unfolding sensory impressions with respet to the under-
lying objet hypothesis (whih, at an appropriately generalized level, is itself
neessary to give unity to the immediate sensory impressions). Objet on-
epts thus impliitly serve as singular expressions of the funtional mapping
between individual sensory impressions and agent ations, whih, (sine they
are not simply the equivalent of these funtions) are inherently ompressive
in nature (thus, to give an idealized example, speifying an objet within a
view-independent 3-D oordinate-spae is far more ompat than setting out
the exhaustive set of possible 2-D planar views on that objet).
Cognitive Bootstrapping Within Kantian A Priori Constraints
It might rst appear that the strong Kantian emphasis on a priori-limited
sensory representation leaves little room for the pereptual updating required
of ognitive bootstrapping. However, this is not the ase; a signiant question
arises with regard to objet onepts ahieving a high-level of empirial on-
rmation. Sine high-level objet hypotheses link lower-level perepts together
in a onjetural unity, these ould, in priniple (when suÆiently empirially
onrmed) serve as the basis for further synthetially-unied objet-onepts.
In this sense, the original objet-onept has beome equivalent to a perep-
tion, albeit at a higher hierarhial level. Thus, we might, for instane, regard
a very familiar objet seen from only one perspetive as a sensory-impression
in its own right, and not in fat as an objet-hypothesis that might be fal-
sied by experiene. This objet might then form the basis of a new objet
hypothesis (for instane, by using it as a referene point for navigation), suh
that the new objet hypothesis assumes the old one as a pre-assumed (though
not fully a priori) basis for ognition.
It is hene the argument of this hapter that within the Kantian objet-
validation framework it is possible for an autonomous ognitive agent to up-
date and validate its own pereptual ategories (whih is to say, engage in
ognitive bootstrapping), but only by proeeding via a bottom-up approah
built on the assumption of the a priori referentiality of the lowest level of the
agent's pereptual hierarhy. Correspondingly, we require the a priori onsis-
teny and relevane of the lowest-level of the agent's motor spae (so that,
for instane, a ognitive entity annot meaningfully query the topology of its
motor-spae independently of that of its pereptual-spae).
The possibility of empirial validation of high-level syntheti perept/ation
unities thus rests on an a priori sensorimotor foundation. It is then these
higher-level syntheti unities that enable pereptual hypothesis validation ex-
periments of the following form: (where A
x
are high-level ations and O
n
high-
level observational states, or perhaps stohasti distributions over states.)
If pereptual hypothesis H
1
is true then, for all denable pereptual transitions O
m
! O
n
suh that O
m
6= O
n
;O
m
; O
n
2 fOg, there exists a unique A
x
2 fAg suh that f[A
x
g , fAg
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Whih retains an empirial ontrast with objet hypothesis validation ex-
periments of the form:
If objet hypothesis H
0
1
is true then performing ation A
x
will result in observation O
m
.
The former pereptual hypothesis validation experiment hene attempts
to determine whether the proposed high-level pereptual framework repre-
sents the proposed high-level ations in the most eÆient (i.e. least redundant
manner) possible. In order that a spae exists in whih to perform this test of
pereptual ompression, there must be an underlying a priori spae of ations
and pereptions available to the agent whih are not themselves subjet to hy-
pothetial unertainty. Thus, in general, while an autonomous ognitive agent
may be free to reinterpret the world in the sense of being able to make an
arbitrary high-level hoie of pereptual hypothesis, H
n
, by whih the world
is to be interpreted, it is not free to hoose an alternative set of ation primi-
tives, fA
0
g, or an alternative set of sensory primitives, fO
0
g, upon whih the
higher-level fAg and fOg are based (e.g. fAg and fOg might be legitimately
dened in terms of arbitrary funtions of n-ary ation/pereption onatena-
tions: fAjA ! n
A
0
g and fOjO ! n
O
0
g). fA
0
g and fO
0
g are hene the terms
upon whih the pereptual validation riterion is impliitly onstruted (and
without whih pereptual reinterpretation is ompletely unonstrained)
2
.
The relationship between [fA
0
g; fO
0
g℄ and [fAg; fOg℄ is learly reursive.
It is therefore the objet of the following to propose that if an agent's a priori
pereption-ation an be hierarhially extrapolated in this manner, it will be
possible to arrive at at a suÆiently abstrated pereption-ation relation suh
that there exists a onept of the symboli representation of the world. We
hene now look at the the subjet of hermeneutis, the branh of philosophy
that deals with the interpretation of symbols, and, ultimately, the mehanism
of ognitive understanding.
The Hermeneuti Cirle and Cognitive Bootstrapping
Hermeneutis emerged initially as the branh of philosophy that deals with
the interpretation of texts, only later aquiring its interpretation as the branh
of philosophy that onerns the mehanism of human understanding. Central
to the latter shool of hermeneutis is Dilthey's notion of the 'hermeneuti
irle' by whih symbols an aquire an objetive meaning. Thus, in order,
say, to arrive at a ditionary of word meanings for a orpus of anient texts,
one simply proposes any a priori-plausible initial set of symbol meanings (for
instane, a ore set of words in an anient text of known meaning with modern-
day meanings attributed to the remainder), and then arries-out a reading
2
Obvious andidates for the sets fA
0
n
g and fO
0
n
g in human ognition are, respe-
tively, the motor omplex and the spae of visually and kinesthetially-determined
body-relative positions of priopereption. Candidates for the inferred fA
n
g and
fO
n
g might be e.g. the intentional at of utting and the pereptual grouping of
knife-like objets as onstituting a distint lass of agent-utilisable entities.
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of the entire orpus of work on this basis in order to arrive at an overall
interpretation. This olletive understanding is then utilized to reinterpret the
omponent texts in the ontext of the whole. These reinterpreted omponent
texts are again utilized to arrive at a new extrapolated interpretation of the
orpus, and so on (errors in the initial set an also be orreted to a stritly
limited extent in this manner).
Hene, generalizing this idea into the domain of ative agents, the hermeneu-
ti irle involves, rstly, an iterated movement from the outward manifesta-
tion of ations to an assumption about their inner, symbolially-determined
motivation, and, seondly, proeeding from this assumption bak again to a
preditive onjeture about the outward manifestation of agent behavior, in
proess of irular empirial renement. It is hene taitly understood (though
not explained) by Dilthey that this reiteration will ahieve a degree of onver-
gene on a nal, stable set of symbol meanings (onvergene to stability being
the only possible riteria of nality). In this latter hermeneuti ontext, the
attribution of meaning to symboli terms is thus dependent upon the embod-
iment of the symbol-manipulating agent within the objetive world; meaning
annot be onferred simply by the manipulation of symboli entities (without
desending into semanti tautology, suh as when attempting to derive the
meaning of every word in a language using only ditionary denitions).
For Heidegger [19℄ this tendeny to regard ognitive meaning as being su-
pervened upon by the ation possibilities of an agent reahed its apotheosis.
He proposed, in his ontologial hermeneutis, that one's sensations are om-
pletely dened by one's ats and one's possibilities. Heidegger thus envisaged
our immediate sensation as being based on instrumentality (Vorhanden), in
whih, for instane, the pereption of a pen would be fully determined by our
possibilities of using it, in partiular our possibility of using it to write, with
further soial and ontextual signiation resting on what we may hoose to
write. Thus, the entirety of our physial being is employed in the pereption
of the pen, rendering the notion of an abstrat mental plane of representa-
tions underlying our pereption entirely redundant. This notion also extended
to the derivation of the objets of knowledge (Zuhanden) from the praxial
knowledge of ation. Objetive knowledge is now an abstration from pratial
knowledge, and not its preursor. In asserting that knowledge is intentional,
there is hene a omplete rejetion of the notion that knowledge is represen-
tational; this is merely an artifat of dualisti Cartesian thought that falsely
separates the body from ognition. Only when intended ations fail to aount
for our atual perepts, do we, 'stand bak' from our pereptions and form a
onept of objetive existent independent from our selves; in the usual run of
things objets are transparent to ognitive agents - we only pereive our own
ative potentialities in the world unless these fail to be realized as expeted.
There is hene in Heidegger's oneption of objetive knowledge, an impliit
ontologial hermeneuti irle.
However, notwithstanding these arguments, the subjet of artiial ogni-
tion has traditionally been founded on Cartesian assumptions (namely, that
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ognition is essentially the rational manipulation of symbols that annot have
objetive meaning). The diÆulty assoiated with non-embodied symbol rep-
resentation has onsequently reated onsiderable philosophial argument.
Hermeneutis and the Possibility of Artiial Cognition
One of the more persistent ritis of the idea of artiial ognition is Drey-
fus [9℄, who argues that the Representational Theory of Mind (in whih the
mind performs permutations of representations of the outside world) fails to
take aount of the ontextuality, relevane and holism of pereption. Dis-
rete, atomi symboli omputation annot aount for the immediay of the
the ognitive situation. He suggests that only embodiment an provide a se-
mantis of ordinary meaning, whih left to symboli omputation alone would
ollapse into merely empty syntati onsiderations. Moreover, this syntax,
even if it existed, ould never be available to ognition without involving
problems of innite regress. Thus, there an be no 'algorithm' underlying
ognition whih we ould isolate and implement; only the situated, symbol-
manipulating agent with an atual, sensible onnetion to the world an be
truly ogent. The world, in eet, provides the 'being' behind the insubstan-
tial formal ategorizations of mind. Artiial ognition might thus exist, but
not in any systematially pre-formalizable way.
Suber [47℄ makes the argument that if mind an be expeted to emerge
from omputation alone, then we should reasonably expet that semantis
an emerge from syntax alone. However the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem of
the branh of mathematis known as model theory demonstrates that even
syntati speiations with an innite ardinality are inapable of uniquely
determining a onrete, existing model. A very large degree of semanti am-
biguity would therefore appear to be assoiated with any nitely formalizable
set of syntati rules, with the orresponding diÆulty that this implies for
the grounding of any putative 'laws of ognition' without a orresponding
embodiment.
A similar view is given by Winograd in [53℄ who argues that the fallay of
ognitive objetivism (the view that ognition an be tangibly formalized) is
aused by overly formal logial struture of early attempts at simulated ogni-
tion (for instane his own SHRDLU algorithm, whih is apable of passing the
Turing test for intelligent behavior provided queries are restrited to the very
limited but omplete ontology of it's internally represented world). Winograd
argues that formal ompleteness of the logial system in whih an agent is
embodied is never available to that agent as a demonstrable fat (this would,
in eet, onstitute a Godel proposition [15℄). Instead the embodied agent an
only alloate nite and partial resoures to omprehending the world
3
. This
3
Following historial diÆulties assoiated with Russell's paradox (i.e. when the
logial onsequenes of set-self membership are expliitly onsidered), we have
beome used to questioning the admissibility of a nite system suh as the human
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naturally leads him to abandon the notion of formally losed ontologies in
any world desription given by an agent; world desriptions have only to be
(and indeed an only be) loally, and not globally, valid. Thus an artiially
onstruted ognitive agent is feasible in pratise, but must neessarily be
of an open-ended design (he was later [52℄ to rejet the possibility that any
physially existing devie for formal symbol manipulation an have intrinsi
meaning outside of that given to it by a subjetive, situated agent; hene a
omputer program a performs a 'task' with 'goals' only if we so designate it).
We thus onlude that it is possible, in priniple, for natural and artiial
systems to overome the paradoxes assoiated with open-ended representa-
tion in lassial ognition and implement an embodied hermeneuti irle for
attahing meaning to spontaneously-generated symbols. We turn now to the
siene of autonomous symbol generation in natural and artiial agents.
3 The Epistemology of Symbol Generation Within
Embodied Agents
From the perspetive of ognitive siene it is possible to give a rather dif-
ferent argument for the form that ognitive bootstrapping must take from
brain enompassing a omplete self-representation within itself (partiularly a
demonstrable self-representation). However, partial or temporally-retrograde self-
models would appear to be permissible, so that it is possible for a human-being
to use a linguisti token 'I' meaningfully and aurately, or, on a omputational
level, to build mobile robots apable of building aurate models of their position
in spae, if not of their full internal state-spae. Complete and immediate self-
models are ruled-out ompletely, though (see for instane [4℄ for a disussion
of the limits to self-observation under nite, Markovian and innite state-spae
assumptions, and [3℄ under quantum-physial assumptions). The use of partial
self-models is thus, in essene, to adopt the hierarhial solution of Russell to his
paradox via the theory of types, in whih sentential referene an only be made to
individual entities on the lowest level of the hierarhy, with sentential referenes
to sentenes about individuals being made only on the level immediately above
this, and so on. Complete, but temporally retrograde self-models, on the other
hand, our at eah iteration of the Universal Turing Mahine that impliitly
attempts to emulate itself within the Halting problem.
These issues give further impetus to the notion of artiial ognitive bootstrap-
ping: sine the underlying mehanism of human ognition an not be knowingly
expressed in a nite and formally omplete manner by any human being, it an
not therefore be diretly implemented using onventional methods of omputa-
tional engineering. A human-equivalent artiial ognitive apability an thus
only be ahieved via an evolving, self-updating design approah. This is, in eet,
to transpose the negative onlusion of the Hilbert programme (the attempt, in
the 1920s to onstrut, in advane, a formal axiomatization of all mathematis)
from a mathemati ontext to that of ognitive siene, where the laws of og-
nition are hene the quantity that is inapable of a provably - i.e. knowingly-
omplete analyti formulation.
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that given above, but to arrive at exatly the same onlusion. In this ase,
the argument is framed in terms of the problem of grounding symbols em-
ployed by autonomous artiial agents. An autonomous ognitive agent is, by
denition, one apable of adapting to its in environment in behavioral and
representational terms that go beyond those implied by its initial set of 'boot-
strap' symboli assumptions, in order to nd representations more suited to
the partiular environment in whih the agent nds itself. Doing so neessi-
tates the use of mehanisms of generalization, inferene and deision making
in order to modify the initial pereptual symbol set in the light of novel forms
of sensory data (an also the mehanisms of dierentiation and analysis to
validate modiations).
Any representation that is apable of abstrat generalization is impliitly
governed by protools suh as those of prediate logi. As suh, the gener-
alized entities must observe stritly formalized laws of interrelationship, and
onsequently, in abstrating the symbol set away from the original set of
innate perept-behavioral pairings, there is a danger of them beoming de-
tahed from any intrinsi meaning in relation to the agent's environment. A
related diÆulty, known as the frame problem [27℄, also arises in suh gener-
alized formal domains; it is by no means lear whih partiular set of logial
onsequenes (given the innite number of possibilities) that the generalized
reasoning system should onern itself with.
There is hene a problem of symbol relevane and 'grounding' unless ad-
ditional mehanisms an be put in plae to form a bridge between the formal
requirements of logial inferene appliable to symbols, and the onstraint of
the relevane of this symbol set to the agent within the ontext of both its
goals and the intrinsi nature of the environment in whih these goals are to be
fullled. In terms of the philosophy of ognition, this neessitates a move from
a Quinean [39℄ to a Wittgensteinian [54℄ frame of referene, in whih symbol
meaning is intrinsially ontextual, and environment-dependent, rather than
being a matter of arbitrary ontologial assumption.
For ognitive agents in the animal kingdom the grounding of symbols is
enfored by the mehanism of Darwinian natural seletion; representations
that do not meaningfully and eÆiently represent the survival prerogatives
of the agent in the ontext of its environment inrease the likelihood of its
extintion and geneti removal from the heredity of future generations [30℄.
This mehanism, however, is not readily available to artiial ognitive agents
other than in the ontext of self-repliating agents within a simulated envi-
ronment (see Sipper's An Introdution to Artiial Life [44℄ for an overview of
this sub-eld). For artiial ognitive agents embodied within the real world
(that is to say, robots), the form that this symbol grounding framework must
take is, by an inreasing onsensus ([25℄, [12℄, [16℄), one of hierarhial stages
of abstration that proeed from the 'bottom-up'. At the lowest level is thus
the immediate relationship between perept and ation; a hange in what is
pereived is primarily brought about by ations in the agent's motor-spae.
This hene limits visual learning to what is immediately relevant to the agent,
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and signiantly redues the quantity of data from whih the agent must on-
strut its symbol domain by virtue of the many-to-one mapping that exists
between the pre-symboli visual spae and the intrinsi motor spae [24℄.
It is onsequently apparent that lassial A.I. approahes to artiial ogni-
tion were of only limited suess in that they attempted to build high-level
environmental representations prior to onsidering agent ations within this
model, rather than allowing this representation to evolve via hierarhial ab-
stration of the a priori perept-ation relation [6℄. Representative priorities
were thus speied in advane by the system-builder and not by the agent,
meaning that an autonomous agent would have had to build its goals and
higher-level representations in terms of the assumed representational modes,
with all the redundany that this implied. Furthermore, novel modes of rep-
resentation were frequently ruled out in advane by this pre-speiation of
sene-desription.
The issue of representation is thus of the rst importane to ognitive
siene. A entral historial onern of the eld has onsequently been to
determine whether mental ats an be interpreted as the ation of a large ol-
letion of individual omputational elements (neuronal models, derived from
physiologial knowledge of the human, mammalian and reptilian brains), or
whether they are to be interpreted at a higher level in terms of representations
or shema. These two shools are respetively labeled the onnetionist and
the symboli. This distintion of approah is perhaps best reeted in their
respetive attitudes towards simulation of the human mind, both within the
eld of ognitive siene as well as in the orrelated engineering disipline
of mahine learning. Simulation of mental states is thus arried out either
via emulation of large numbers of individual neurons, in whih ase we ex-
pet mental properties to arise as emergent properties, or else the simulation
is exeuted at the shemati or representational level, in whih ase the a-
tual underlying omputational mehanis are of no inherent signiane. In
the former ase, simulation is independent only of the underlying omputa-
tional substrate (a logial unit an equally well be enated by a radio-valve
as a transistor), in the latter ase simulation is independent of the partiular
omputational implementation of the representational algorithm.
A entral problem for symboli interpretations of ognitive psyhology is
thus to apture the fat the mental formalisms must be simultaneously both
omputational and representational; that is mental symbols must be manip-
ulable by logial rules and also apable of referring to aspets of the world.
Newell and Simon [33℄ were the rst both to posit and to propose a solu-
tion to this problem from the perspetive of ognitive psyhology, entering
on the onept of physial symbol systems. Here, physial relations (proximi-
ties, ausalities and so on) provide the referential basis for symbol strutures
expressed within the brain.
Environmental adaptation (through Darwinian natural seletion) is on-
sequently the assumed ageny onstraining the formal symbol struture to
mimi the physial environment (or at least those aspets of it that are rele-
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vant to the survival of the symboli agent) within biologial agents expressing
Newell and Simon's ideas. This aspet of the symboli aount was further
brought out by Pinker and Bloom in the ontext of language evolution [37℄,
who argued that 'grammar is a omplex mehanism tailored to the trans-
mission of [physially representable℄ propositional strutures through a se-
rial interfae', the serial interfae being the voal ommuniation hannel.
Biologially-based aounts of symboli ausality thus agree that the rep-
resentativity of mental symbols is haraterized by their apaity to ensure
the ontinuing existene of the symbol-manipulating agent (or at least its
genetially-ontiguous progeny). Thus, while the symboli manipulation sys-
tem may be ompletely formal, the representativity of the symbols in the
symboli aount is ontingent and environmentally determined.
In this wider biologial ontext, the partiular symboli model proposed by
Newell and Simon an then be onsidered expliitly one of ognitive bootstrap-
ping in the sense that world-model updates are ahieved via geneti variations
through mutation or sexual reprodution (equating to the hypothesis updat-
ing stage of ognitive bootstrapping), and are empirially heked for their
referening ability in terms of the agent's attempts to survive within the envi-
ronment (equating to the hypothesis veriation stage). The initial bootstrap
symbol set is thus arrived at ontingently, but the iterative onvergene of the
symbol referene system rapidly removes all traes of its random origin until
an appropriate representation is arrived at (if only asymptotially).
The above model assumes a relatively onstant environment in relation
to whih the organism in question evolves. Conversely, where environments
are not onstant, and are hanging at a faster rate than geneti adaptation
an allow for, we would expet to nd that the innate symbols aquire an
inappropriate referene (suh as, for instane, amongst humans, where animal
threat assessments are alibrated to our hunter-gatherer past, rather than our
urban/agrarian present; notably, the human instantiation of the primate's
innate fear of the larger arnivores). It is therefore neessary, if Newell and
Simon's notion of physial symbol systems is to be extended to symboli infer-
ene mehanisms apable of autonomously updating themselves, that the Dar-
winian mehanism of bootstrapping be replaed by a more rapidly-updating
tehnique that nonetheless retains the former mehanism's groundedness in
the environmental survival imperatives of the ognitive agent: this shall be
the subjet of later disussion. We note for the present, however, that the
innate, naturally-seleted physial symbol set serves eetively as an initial
pereptual meaning hypothesis for ognitive bootstrapping.
In ontrast to the formal mehanis of the Symboli approah, Conne-
tionist aounts seek to omprehend agent meaning attribution in terms of the
aggregate information proessing abilities of arrays of neuronal units, in inten-
tional repliation of mammalian or reptilian brain physiology. Cognitive prop-
erties an thus arise emergently, without expliit formal struture. An example
of this is Complementary Reinforement Bak-Propagation (CRBP) training
within artiial neural networks [26℄, whih is proposed as way of ahieving
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self-volitional behavior in robots through neuronal onstraints alone. Mar-
shall et al. thus onjeture that self-direted learning behavior omes about
as the result of ompeting tensions, suh as that between the ompulsion to
model existing pereptual states eetively and the ompulsion to seek out
novel states. The 'homeostasis' thus ahieved allows the network to bootstrap
inreasingly omplex behavior patterns. CRBP diretly models this behav-
ior by, in addition to allowing bak-propagation to reinfore internal goals in
the onventional manner, also allowing the omplement of the goal state to
serve as negative behavior reinforement during bak-propagation. The ten-
sion between these ontrary goal imperatives is hene diretly modeled within
the neural network struture, foring the agent to test ognitive models by
deliberately seeking areas in whih they break down, and thus to rene them.
A key milestone of the Connetionist approah was thus the demonstra-
tion of the Boolean-logi ompleteness of suh neuronal aggregates via the
multi-layer pereptron (MLP) model. However, the MLP model laks Turing-
ompleteness due to the absene of memory assoiated with individual neurons
(as opposed to the neuronal network as a whole, whih does exhibit memory
apability). It was hene determined by Franklin and Garzon [10℄ that the
standard MCulloh-Pitts net augmented with expandable memory is Turing-
omplete and hene apable of arbitrary formal-language manipulation. The
Symboli and Connetionist approahes had, for the rst time, thus ahieved
a demonstrable equivalene. Gardenfors [12℄ later onstruted a propositional
language system based on the theory of funtional dynamis applied to (purely
abstrat) information states. A neural network that undergoes learning gener-
alization of the Hebbian kind in response to new information is thus shown to
perform an indutive inferene of the kind reognized in formal logi. Hene
the symboli/onnetionist equivalene is not simply an interpretation of the
the underlying neural onnetionist model; it has atual referential apability.
At a more general remove, another approah to unifying the symboli and
onnetionist aounts, involving a ommon model for both artiial neural-
network lassiation funtions as well as formal symboli onstruts suh as
verbal grammar, is to view brain ognition as a form of ompression. This
approah, rst suggested by Wolf [55℄, sees the essene of ognitive ageny
within the world as being the ability to represent the varied mass of sensory
information in a ompat (and thus, generalized) form. Hene, grammatial
rules may be regarded as ompressed expressions of language possibility, and
lassiation may be seen as a ompression of sense-data. The objet onept
itself an be derived by the redundany or ommonality between stereosopi,
or multi-angular images (ompare this with the Kantian notion of the objet
onept as a unier of perspetives).
In animal ognition, the mehanism motivating this ompression is Dar-
winian natural-seletion; biologial agents employing better generalizers (whih
is to say, better ompressors) use fewer neurons to nd food by enoding su-
essful hunting strategies in the most general manner possible. Sine suh
agents inherently require less food to sustain their smaller neuronal budgets,
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there ensues a 'virtuous irle' in whih they stand a greater hange of sur-
viving and reproduing than their less eÆiently-ompressing relatives. Pro-
gressive generations thus inreasingly enhane the likelihood of agents with
ever more eonomized ognitive apaities (whih is to say eÆient sensory
ompression mehanisms). Moreover, when the environmental requirements
are not stati (as, for instane, in the ontext of hominid evolution), the se-
letion pressure is towards ever more generalized representative apabilities
(whih is to say towards mehanisms of ever more eÆient ompression of
non-spei data). This is hene a fully open-ended ognitive bootstrapping
mehanism - the ontinuous need of the speies to whih the agent belongs
to ompress general, previously unexperiened sensory data amounts to a
proess of pereptual hypothesis formation, sine the generalizability of the
ompression must be tested by feeding the hypothesis bak into environment
to establish its usefulness to the agent (in a proess of hypothesis veriation).
The agent's perept ategories hene beome self-founding in a proess akin
to the hermeneuti irle. We now look more losely at the spei form that
the pereption-ation relation must take in embodied agents.
The Embodied Pereption-Ation Relation in Cognitive Biology
The notion that the form of our onsious pereption of the external world
is ditated by, or further, dened within the terms of the ations that we
may perform within it, is ommon both to phenomenology (as indiated in
the Philosophy setion), and also to several long-standing shools of ognitive
siene. (Dewey had argued as early as 1896 [8℄ that pereption, thought
and ation must be onsidered as part of the same stratum). A paradigmati
example of ation-based pereption in ognitive siene is given in the study
of environmental aordane, a term rst oined by James Gibson [13℄, and
speied in [28℄ as having the following properties:
 1. An aordane exists relative to the ation apabilities of a partiular agent.
 2. The existene of an aordane is independent of the agent's ability to pereive it.
 3. An aordane does not hange as the needs and goals of the agent hange.
Aordanes, being the ation possibilities of the agent's environment, are thus
objetive in the sense of being invariant to arbitrary shifts in interpretation.
However, a omplementarity is impliated between pereiver and pereived:
the riterion of auray for pereptual representation now depends on the
agent's ability to represent its own ative possibilities, i.e its self-model. Re-
lated shematizations of embodied ognition inlude Lako's [23℄ argument
that reason is itself patterned by the spatial awareness of ageny. Glenberg
[14℄ similarly argues that oneptualization is onstrained by the struture of
the environment, our bodies, and our memory apaity. On the applied side of
ognitive siene are the searhes for neural orrelates of embodied ognition,
for instane Berluhi and Aglioti's [1℄ argument that the imitation of move-
ments within neonates is indiative of an impliit neural body-struture model
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from whih later neural body-struture models are determined. This model
provides a referene frame that further extends to the neural determination
of inanimate objet models. The mehanism of objet understanding is thus
a ognitive bootstrap to the extent that it requires, rstly, an initial set of a
priori assumptions (the impliit model) in terms of whih the world model
is rst dened and, seondly, a onstrutive engagement between the world
and agent's world-representation in order to rene this model. This work, and
others like it, thus serve to validate Piaget's [35℄ notion that higher ognitive
funtions have their roots in lower-level biologial mehanisms.
A similar idea is expressed by Millikan [30℄ with regard to language and
intentionality, arguing that funtion an only be attributed to an entity within
a biologial ontext. She hene proposes a biologial solution to the Kripke-
Wittgenstein paradox, whih relates to the apparent impossibility (at least in
Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein) of establishing absolute oneptual or per-
eptual identity between ommuniating agents, sine an unbounded notion
suh as the onept of 'addition' ould never be proven to be the same for
both agents. For example, one agent's rule of addition might be the 'orret'
one; 8x; y z := x + y, whereas the other agent's rule might be some near ap-
proximation suh as; 8x; y x < 510
9
; y < 510
9
z := x+y; else z := 5. In
any reasonably nite senario these agents would falsely form the impression
that they both had the same understanding of the addition onept. Millikan's
resolution of the paradox is to propose that natural seletion serves to remove
the latter formulation of the addition rule on the grounds of its ineÆieny; it
does the same essential referring as the former rule with regard to reasonably
small numbers (suh as those the agents typially experiene in their biolog-
ial lifetime), but uses more omputation to do so. Hene aggregate natural
seletion will favor the smallest generalization onsistent with the biologially
neessary referents (thus providing a basis for Oam's Razor).
Millikan's work thus overomes the lassial problem of referene, where
the relation between perept and objet appears to be arbitrary (we might,
for instane, ask why we regard the pereptual lass animal as a singular
entity, rather than as a olletion of organi sub-objets or as a subpart of a
speies-olletive). Millikan argues that the partiular form the perept takes
in relation to the objet and the agent-objet interation has an inherent
survival value for the agent (we have traditionally hunted animals for food,
and so regard an individually huntable unit as a single pereptual entity).
Perept models that do not eÆiently model the survival-relative aspets of
the objet in relation to the agent's ation possibilities simply ease to exist
on an evolutionary time-sale.
4 Linguisti Signiation and Embodied Ageny
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the autonomous learning of sym-
boli representations ours in human language. In attempting ommuniation
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with another ognitive entity, agents must neessarily nd a representation of
the ommonalities of their experiene prior to alloating exhangeable lin-
guisti tokens apable of standing in for these representations. That is, we
must abstrat from our immediate pereptions in order to nd that aspet of
them that is aessible to a real or putative seond entity embodying a similar
pereptive apability. As we have seen, the possibility of the abstration of
aspets of our pereption/ation experiene into the third person is, for Kant,
already impliit in our pereption of the world. Pereptions are inherently
experiened as having a ertain unifying onstany under the transformations
assoiated with agent ations; that is, we pereive objets from perspetives,
rather than pure sensory impressions. The abstration of our experiene re-
quired for ommuniation is thus impliit at the outset. However, this rigid,
predetermined ontologial struture might not initially appear to allow for
the possibility of learning a language, or for the spontaneous evolution of an
appropriate language between ognitive entities attempting to desribe their
ognitive world at an appropriate level of detail. How is it then possible, in a
ommuniative ontext, for ognitive entities to establish a ommon symboli
representation of the world that goes beyond what is neessitated a priori?
Impliit in this idea is the formulation of a symboli representation of the
agent itself. Rohrer [41℄, for instane, suggests that linguistis should properly
be regarded as a sub-siene of ognitive siene, proposing that the basis for
language is the projetion of one's own ageny model into the pereptual do-
main; that is, a de-relativizing of experiene in order to establish a ommon
frame of referene. Perry [34℄, Bermudez [2℄ and Metzinger [29℄ also agree that
ognitive self-awareness (as manifested by the linguisti token 'I') requires all
ommuniating parties to have internal representations of both the world and
of the various inter-ommuniating agents; in no other irumstanes an one
expliitly attribute pereptions to oneself. (Viezzer argues in [49℄ that the
symbol grounding problem an only really be solved by modeling both the
agent's world [at the pereption/ation level℄ and the agent's modeling of the
world in order to permitting genuine representational updating by the agent).
Pinker [36℄ argues that language derives from an initial ognitive orienta-
tion attributable to an ative agent (so that, for example, the fundamental
noun/verb split mimis the pereption/ation division), whih then develops
along more omplex lines via a semanti bootstrapping mehanism.
Spontaneous Language Formation in Embodied Agents
The study of spontaneous language formation in simulated agents gains its
philosophial imperative in onsequene of the symbol grounding problem rst
enuniated by Harnad [17℄. Harnad's thesis demands a semanti interpretation
of formal symbol systems that transends the (merely syntati) interrelation-
ships available to the symboli manipulation system in question. The problem
Harnad identies is analogous to the learning of non-native languages in hu-
mans; this is muh more meaningful when attempted in situ amongst other
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speakers of the language than when learned from a ditionary. Harnad onse-
quently proposes two forms of symboli grounding in partiular; 'ioni repre-
sentations', whih are eetively equivalent to lass pereptual medians, and
'ategorial representations', whih onsist of both learned and a priori feature
invariants. Steels gives perhaps the paradigmati demonstration of semanti
grounding in the formation of language in the 'Talking Heads Experiment'
[45℄, the motivation for whih is to demonstrate that 'ommuniation through
language is the main driving fore in bootstrapping the representational a-
paities of intelligent agents'. Language and meaning are onsequently oeval
in this senario; symboli syntax arises at the same time as semantis.
The talking heads experiment hene onsists in a pair of roboti agents
eah equipped with a video amera and a set of predetermined low-level fea-
ture desriptors that an be arbitrarily mapped to internally-generated words.
One agent is initially designated the 'speaker', and the other the 'hearer'. The
agents oupy an environment in whih planar objets of various olors are
distributed at random (for instane red squares, blue triangles et). The des-
ignated speaker then hooses one item at random from this ommon ontext
and attempts to desribe it using its own internal lexion (whih it annot
simply assume is shared by the hearer). The hearer must then guess the or-
ret item and point at it, failure to do so requiring the hearer to update its
internal lexion by generating a new word denition that suessfully disam-
biguates the indiated item. The role of hearer and listener are then exhanged
over a series of language games in order that an objetive world desription
be nally obtained by both agents (as opposed to the idential, but speaker-
subjetive world desription that would arise if the roles of speaker and hearer
were xed). Word denitions are thus haraterized in terms of ombinations
of a priori feature desriptors of a visual nature; for instane, olor, horizon-
tal objet positions, vertial objet positions, et. For example, onsider an
experimental ontext in whih two objets A and B, a red triangle loated at
the top of the eld of view and a blue square loated at the bottom of the eld
of view, are the respetive objets of interest. These might be disambiguated
by word-desriptors of the form: A: vertial position > 0.5; B: vertial position
< 0.5. Or, equivalently, by desriptors of the form: A: red; B: blue
There is hene no unambiguously 'orret' objet word-representation in
this senario, and onsequently no ground truth pereptual spae aessible to
the agents. If these two alternative sets of lexial designations were alloated
to the speaker and hearer, respetively, it would onsequently only be within
an expanded experimental ontext that the disrepany in desription would
ome to light. For instane, only if a third blue objet were introdued and
loated towards the bottom of the eld of view, would the speaker be required
to learn to distinguish the onept of olor as a distint pereptual ategory
(though it always inherently had the latent apaity to do so), in order to
distinguish every objet employed within the word-game (perhaps orrelating
with the neonatal synaesthesia hypothesis [18℄). Equally, the hearer would
need to evolve word desriptions that inorporated spatial onsiderations only
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in order to distinguish all three objets within the extended senario. Steels'
ahievement is onsequently in demonstrating that lexial onvergene be-
tween speaker and hearer does indeed our. Moreover, provided that there
exists a suÆient rihness in the range of objet senarios, the talking heads
experiment demonstrates that this onvergene is objetive (in the sense that
the nal word distintions orrespond to our ground truth desriptions in
terms of the a priori features).
This result is onsequently onsistent with the hypothesis that 'third-
person' ognitive modeling lies at the heart of the symbol/referent relation.
The objetivity (or subjet-independene) of the nal onvergene of the word
designations hene omes about beause language onjetures are projeted
by the speaker bak into the environment for validation on the assumption of
the presene of a hearer with a linguisti and indiative apability similar (in
a priori terms) to it own; self-modeling of pereptual ageny is thus impliit
in the experimental senario. In philosophial terms, the talking heads exper-
iment embodies the Wittgensteinian (f [54℄) view of ommuniative ativity
as a 'language game' in whih agents invent words and meanings during their
interations, and opposes the Quinean [39℄ view that sees language as a series
of indutive abstrations of pereptual orrelations between word and objet.
5 Approahes to the Spontaneous Generation of
Symboli Representations in Embodied Artiial Agents
The engineering eld in whih embodied ognitive bootstrapping reeives its
most tangible expression is thus robotis; the study of programmable ma-
hine systems. When this programmability extends to the notion of self-
programmability, we are onerned with the partiular eld subset known as
autonomous robotis. When the goal is further to onstrut a sensory model
of (presumably previously unexperiened) environments, we are then impli-
itly in the realm of artiial embodied ognition or ognitive robotis. Reent
advanes in the omputer proessing power available for real-time omputa-
tion have allowed robotis to begin to employ ognitive vision methods, for
whih the sensory input onsists of mono-, stereo- or multi-sopi amera
feeds. Environmental modeling in the ognitive vision regime is hene analo-
gous to that exhibited by the mammalian ognitive vision system (partiularly
when dealing with with stereo and multisopi amera feeds, for whih a sig-
niant omputational burden is the three-dimensional reonstrution of the
environment from planar projetions). Typial low-level ognitive tasks thus
inlude edge detetion, objet segmentation, motion registration, and so on,
with potentially ever higher levels of ognitive abstration possible beyond
the immediate low-level vision tasks.
One partiular area of investigation that impliates the notion of ognitive
bootstrapping ours at the interfae of visual and hapti pereption (e.g. [42℄,
[43℄). When a mammalian agent interats with the environment, it impliitly
Epistemi Constraints on Autonomous Symboli Representation 19
updates its visual model of the environment by hapti ontat, using the a
priori ertainly of touh data to redue the ambiguity present in visual data
(partiularly the ambiguities of binoular sene reonstrution). Moreover, it
appears that the mammalian brain ahieves this Bayes-optimally. The ogni-
tive bootstrap in this model is thus the use of visual pereption to motivate
sensorimotor ations suh as those involved in grasping for an objet in order
to test the validity of those same visual pereptions. As before, the bootstrap-
ping of an initial, partially representative model and the iterative onvergene
between perepts and perept-motivated ations hene ats to overome the
logial paradox inherent in a self-validated pereptual system. More generally
the onept of the pereption-ation yle impliit in these visual-hapti mod-
els an by seen as the most tangible basis on whih to implement an artiial
ognitive bootstrap mehanism. Pereptions are hene seen as environmental
hypotheses while ations are hypothesis validation steps. More speially, vi-
sion is to be understood as a hypothetial linkage between possible instanes
of hapti ontat (suh as in 3D objet reonstrution), and vision-motivated
ations test the validity (or at least onsisteny) of these models.
The degree to whih artiial ognition an be made fully open-ended
is thus a matter of arhiteture; however, it is neessary, or at least, vastly
simplifying, to inorporate a number of a priori onstraints on the ognitive
reinterpretation proess, the general minimum being the presene of a sensory
topology that denes the arena in whih the autonomous robot is ative as a
spae. However, this spatial representation need not neessarily our at the
lowest level of the vision hierarhy, a point that will beome apparent in the
following disussion.
Hierarhial Perept-Ation Approahes to Cognitive Robotis
Hierarhial approahes to autonomous robotis were rst proposed by Brooks
in [5℄, who employed the term subsumption arhiteture. The assumption of
suh arhitetures is that agent abilities are arranged in levels, with higher-
level ompetenes inorporating lower-level ompetenes. For instane, the
ability to plan a route presupposes the ability to avoid obstales. Higher ar-
hitetural layers hene ontrol the behavior of the lower via the mehanism of
inhibition, allowing the possibility of open-ended development of the ognitive
agent's responses. Brooks notes that dierent forms of environment represen-
tation are appropriate to the diering levels, and that these levels an be
extended indenitely; however, the possibility of autonomously abstrating
these higher hierarhial levels along with an appropriate environment rep-
resentation is not diretly onsidered. For this, we require an abstratable
perept-ation arhiteture.
Modayil [31℄ hene proposes a method of bootstrapping progressively
higher levels of symboli representation, up to and inluding the onept of
objets, via the lustering of representations from lower levels of the OPAL
(Objet Pereption and Ation Learner) arhiteture. Bootstrap learning thus
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allows the system to move from egoentri (view-entered) and alloentri
(objet-entered) sub-symboli desriptions to symboli objet-based desrip-
tion by asending a four-fold hierarhy; Individuation, Traking, Image De-
sription and Categorization. Individuation involves the use of oupany
grids to lassify individual sensor readings as either stati or dynami. Clusters
of dynami readings are then traked over time to provide an objet model;
stable shape models are then onstruted from the onsistent aspets of the
objets so formed. OPAL is thus apable of autonomously disretizing the
sensory environment into a stati bakground, the learning robot, and a set
of movable objets via the abstration of a pereption-ation arhiteture.
Granlund [16℄ provides a still more general arhiteture for ognitive
robotis based on the notion that sene desription is not required prior to a-
tion. Thus, it is argued that the failure of onventional ognitive arhitetures
is due to the ategori abstration of objets at an intermediate stage between
perept formation and ation speiation. What is lost in this approah are
the ontextual modiers neessary for preise speiation of agent ation; in
short, we gain desriptivity at the expense of intentionality, the latter being
relevant only to an embodied agent in a partiular ontext. Granlund hene
proposes a bootstrap mehanism for the initial learning of the embodied sys-
tem based on a pereption-ation feedbak yle. Here, in the learning phase
of the pereption-ation mapping, ation always preedes pereption. Thus,
the potentially exponential omplexity of the perept domain is limited by
onsidering only those perepts diretly related to ations, whih onsequently
oupy a far smaller state-spae. (An idea of the information-theoreti dispar-
ity between these two dierent types of environmental modeling, the agent-
spei and the agent-non-spei, is found in [32℄). In the absene of expliit
sene-representation ations are hene driven by biologially-motivated ran-
dom exploration impulses (literally random walks in the ation state spae).
The perept-ation mapping an thus be made subjet to various optimiza-
tion proedures that allow ompat representation, and impliitly, therefore,
generalization. The random ations and subsequent ompat perept map-
pings thus amount to an unsupervised training of the arhiteture. There
onsequently exists a natural stopping riterion for the random ation im-
pulses at the point at whih the ompat representation of the perept-ation
mapping no longer undergoes signiant hange (learning having onverged).
At this point the random ation impulses an asend to a greater level of ab-
stration and operate on the higher-level perept-ation representations that
have been generated by the ompat generalization. These higher level a-
tion impulses themselves generate further training data at the lower levels,
allowing for robust and adaptive learning aross the whole of the hierarhial
struture so formed.
These ompat representations within the hierarhial perept-ation stru-
ture are symbols, orresponding, for instane, to the symbols employed in ver-
bal ommuniation. Suh ommuniation might hene be onsidered a low-
bandwidth interation between agents that allows omplex ations to be initi-
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ated in one agent by another by virtue of the 'unpaking' of the ompat rep-
resentations that takes plae as information travels down the perept-ation
hierarhy from the highest to the lowest levels. Symboli ommuniation be-
tween suh agents is hene always grounded. The ognitive arhiteture thus
dened is learly one of ognitive bootstrapping; the inferred higher-level og-
nitive hypotheses validate themselves in terms of the lower-level hypotheses
by virtue of the 'ltering-down' eet wherein ation impulses in the high-level
abstrated ognitive ategories result in progressively more ontextualized low-
level ations. Only at the highest goal-setting level is there thus a requirement
for environment representations that are ompletely logially self-onsistent
(suh as a oarse-grained reonstrution of the three-dimensional volume in
whih the agent ats): lower hierarhial levels need only be para-onsistent.
Sun [48℄, in setting out a foundation for artiial ognitive arhite-
tures, similarly argues that human ognition is essentially 'bottom-up' and
further, that minimal initial bootstrap models are neessary to avoid over-
representational models that may fail to generalize. Stein [46℄ also argues that
goal-based behavior in ognitive robots should be onsidered, not only at an
abstrat symboli level, but also at the lowest sensorimotor levels. Hene, in
projeting a goal, a roboti agent should utilize exatly the same exploratory
and learning proesses that it uses to interat with the real world, but instead
substitute a 'virtual reality' interfae at the very lowest level of the sensors
and atuators. This virtual reality is preisely the sensory map formed by the
urrently hypothesized world-model. 'Cognition', for Stein, is hene simply
the imagined sensation and ation impliit in traing out an ation path to a
partiular goal state in the world-model. Stein's MetaToto hene self-trains its
higher-level ognitive abilities using only its internal representations. There
is perhaps a Darwinian justiation for this imaginative self-training; a bi-
ologial agent that tests its ation hypotheses in imagination an rule out
potentially unsurvivable ations without endangering itself. Suh agents are
thus more likely to prevail and reprodue than equivalent unreetive agents.
In human terms, this priniple may also relate to the phenomenon of sleep
paralysis (treated more ompletely in the disussion and onlusions setion).
A framework for autonomous pereption-ation learning that employs in-
dutive logi programming to establish environment protools and bootstrap
appropriate high-level symboli representations is given by the author in [51℄.
For a generi sensor-atuator oupling plaed within a spei environment,
only ertain of the set of possible ations will serve to alter the perept spae in
a onsistent fashion. Hene, after randomized exploration and indution of the
rules governing this ation legitimay, the ognitive system sets out to elimi-
nate redundant pereptual prediates in the inferred lauses in order to express
a new, higher-level perept-ation orrespondene in whih its ations are al-
ways suessful. Suh higher level pereption-ation representation is always
of a more symboli and abstrated nature than the generi sensor-atuator
oupling, ultimately dening an open-ended series of logially-desribed envi-
ronmental aordanes of a form appropriate to verbal ommuniation.
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6 Disussion and Conlusions
We have looked at the problem of autonomous symbol generation in a range
of natural and artiial agents, and have identied the mehanism of 'ogni-
tive bootstrapping' as a means of aomplishing this in a maximally open-
ended and epistemologially-onsistent fashion. Cognitive Bootstrapping is
hene the iterative mehanism by whih ognition an beome self-founding
without falling into Quine's ontologial relativism [40℄, in whih any world
representation an be onsidered valid. The mehanism thus iterates between
interpretation (in whih perept ategories are applied to the world) and ex-
ploration (in whih sensory-data that has the potential to larify the validity
of the onjetured perepts is sought). Cognitive bootstrapping hene on-
stitutes a form of the hermeneuti irle within a pereption-ation learning
ontext.
Critially, sine the exploratory phase is onduted in terms of the existing
and potentially invalid perept ategories, the initial 'bootstrap' hypothesis
must have a degree of a priori validity in order to allow progressive on-
vergene on an 'objetive' model. Furthermore, there must exist an a priori
riterion of perept-hypothesis validation/falsiation impliit in the boot-
strap hypothesis (suh as hapti ontat in the ase of autonomous visual-
hapti robotis). These a priori perept ategories (often taking the form of
ontat-sensing and motor-spae feedbak within physially-embodied ogni-
tive entities) are thus not admissible to the pereptual updating proedure,
and represent the sole limitations on the extent to whih ognition an be-
ome self-determining. (We may hene legitimately doubt the visual perep-
tion of an objet but not the fat of our hapti ontat with it, or the musle-
artiulations involved in reahing out to it).
We thus overome the paradox inherent in onstruting a ognitive agent
with unlimited apaity for forming novel perept ategories with whih to
view the world, whih must nonetheless be able to pereive whether these
ategories are representative of the world. Overoming the paradox by boot-
strapping requires that we have an initial set of low-level perept ategories
that we must assume are 'orret', and then hierarhially progress from there
to higher-level ategories via perept-hypothesis formation and ation-based
testing. This initial ategory set, we argue, is the set of Kantian a priori og-
nitive ategories apable of providing a framework in whih Popperian [38℄
falsiation of perept ategory hypotheses an be adequately formulated.
Without this mehanism a pereiving subjet ould not distinguish internal
pereptual and external objet states with any epistemologial ertainty.
The question then arises as to what onstitutes the minimal a priori ate-
gory set required for ognitive bootstrapping in the artiial ognitive domain;
the a priori ognitive ategories underlying the ognitive bootstrap need not
be struturally idential with those of humans. For instane, in a ognitive
arhiteture suh as Granlund's [16℄, rather than an objet ategory being
imposed a priori, we have instead the broader-based a priori notion of invari-
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ant perept subspaes from whih ompat and invariant symboli entities of
inreasing hierarhial omplexity an be progressively dened, inluding the
syntheti ategory of 'objet'.
The ontext of symbol-hypothesis falsiation in this arhiteture is then
the perept-ation link oupled with an exploratory imperative (even a simple
'random walk' imperative will suÆe). Thus, the arhiteture presumes that
the output of symbol manipulation must always result in an atual or poten-
tial ation, the eetiveness of whih the agent must determine from within
the perept spae (whih itself inorporates the higher level symboli enti-
ties). Hene, an ation imperative derived at the symboli level (for instane,
the plaing of one partiular objet on top of another) an only be evalu-
ated as having been arried-out suessfully by utilizing both the higher-level
symboli ategories (sine the imperative was formulated in these terms) and
the lowest-level objet representation (sine this provides the primary link
between the symboli layer and the a priori sensory level of whih it is an
invariant subspae ategory). The symbol system is thus always semantially
grounded; the system an spontaneously form and evaluate the suitability of
invariant ategories (whih are always hypothesized), subjet only to the on-
straint that it an not re-evaluate the validity of the a priori sensory level, or
the invariant subspae ategorization mehanism itself.
In terms of biologial agents, a priori environment representation proeeds
via Darwinian natural seletion. However, environmental seletion pressures
on repliating agents in a rapidly hanging environment (relative to the evo-
lution rate) will always tend to favor ognitive arhitetures that generalize to
the greatest extent given their initial a priori onguration. Suh agents must
hene evolve via a bootstrap proess toward a minimization of the disparity
between the biologial agent's internal world representation and the speies-
based survival imperatives imposed by the environment. Human soietal (as
opposed to geneti) evolution meets this riterion, with survival demands
on human ommunities typially hanging on generational, rather than evo-
lutionary, time sales. Here, the means of repliation of human behavior and
understanding is not gene-based (whih would respond only very slowly to en-
vironmental pressures) but rather meme-based, that is to say, repliated via
linguisti ommuniation, and is hene apable of far more rapid evolution
(see [7℄). We hene agree with Millikan [30℄ that the a priori representativity
of ongenital human perepts is granted via natural seletion (so that, for
instane, if human beings' innate pereption of ingestability did not, to some
degree, orrelate with those objets in the environment that met with their
nutritional requirements, then the speies would not have proved biologially
viable in the long term). Any artiial autonomous agent would similarly re-
quire a minimal set of guaranteed referential perept ategories, but, in the
absene of a framework of natural seletion, these would have to be imposed
by their designers, perhaps motivated along biologial lines.
Given that the referentiality of pereption must be ensured at the outset,
the question then arose of how, within the onnes of these Kantian restri-
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tions, open-ended ognitive development is atually to be aomplished. We
have seen that, in general, the pereptual optimization strategy adopted by
biologial and artiial agents is one of pereptual ompression; the idea be-
ing to redue the total sensory stream into a relatively few signiant data.
This, however, is still not suÆient, in itself, to determine the appropriate-
ness of a proposed pereptual update - after all, it is always possible to map
every perept to a single datum, giving maximal ompression at the expense
of all environmental information. Thus, any novel pereptual inferene must
be allied with an ation omplex within whih this pereptual inferene is sus-
tained. We thus utilize a perept mehanism of unknown value in order to
interpret the external world in suh a way that we an gain suÆient informa-
tion in order to evaluate the worth of that pereption mehanism. If it proves
insuÆient to the task of gathering enough evidene to validate itself, then
it automatially fails that validation. Any new perept ategorizations must
hene be made in terms of well-established or pereptual bootstrap ategories,
suh that these new perept ategorizations an in turn be treated as the basis
for further ategorizations in a hierarhial fashion. We thus always maintain
a 'fall-bak' mehanism for empirial validation, irrespetive of the perep-
tual framework adopted. A onsequene of this is that an autonomous agent
with no overall goal other than randomized exploration an form an enor-
mous range of intentional sub-goals by virtue of the hierarhiality impliit in
bootstrapped ognitive struture.
This notion of hierarhially-grounded intentionality would then orrelate
with the existene of the 'sleep-paralysis' mehanism in mammals. Aording
to the ativation-synthesis theory [20℄, during rapid eye movement (REM)
sleep, randomized neuronal stimulation is applied to the pons area of the
brain as part of its memory onsolidation ativity. This randomized ativity
is interpreted at the pereptual level as dreaming. Dreaming is hene expe-
riened as high-level visual and auditory stimuli of the same sort that our
in waking life, albeit with an appropriately randomized narrative omponent.
However, this imagery is not merely abstrated symbolism, being rather hier-
arhially grounded in the perept-ation omplex of the organism. Mammals
thus have an innate tendeny to at out responses to the dream-stimuli in an
intentional and physial manner. It is therefore neessary for the brain stem
to atively prevent this motor stimulation from making the nal onnetion
from the lowest-level of the grounded hierarhy to the musles: a failure of
this mehanism results in the phenomenon of sleep-walking.
A further example of the hierarhial grounding of higher-level visual per-
epts in low-lever perept-ation mappings ours in the mirror-neurons of
the primate premotor ortex [11℄: these neurons re in response both to mo-
tor ations performed by the primate, as well as to those same motor ations
performed by other primates in the observing primate's visual eld. The high
level visual perepts orresponding to the observed ation must thus be hier-
arhially grounded in the intentional lower-level ation states.
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Conlusion
In onlusion, it is apparent from our analysis of Kant that a 'blank slate'
approah to ognitive updating is not feasible. Certain minimal ategorial
assumptions must inhere in pereption in order to dene it as suh, in dis-
tintion to the pereived environment. In terms of ognitive robotis these
restritions mean that agents are not simply free to apply arbitrary gener-
alization tehniques to the reinterpretation of raw sensory data in order to
bootstrap novel pereptual primitives. By the same token, biologial agents
(e.g. humans) apable of autonomous ognitive updating must employ a er-
tain degree of naturally-seleted representative apability in order to serve as
a basis for further updating of their representational framework.
Cognitive agents must hene initially haraterize their ative environment
aording to pre-speied imperatives (speies-survival in the ase of biologial
agents, but potentially more general imperatives for artiial agents). How-
ever, we have demonstrated that the pereption-ation relation is apable of
hierarhial abstration to the symboli level, with higher-level representa-
tions validated in terms of the high-level ations impliit in them. The only
limit on the ability of agents employing this approah to bootstrap new per-
eptual ategorizations is then the retention of the a priori strutures required
to give an empirial validation riterion for both the updated representational
frameworks as well as the environmental representations themselves.
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